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GEORGE W. PRENTISS v. ELISHA W. SIAW ET AL.
The plaintiff was unlawfully seized by the defendants, carried thence three miles
and confined in a room several hours, and thence to a town meeting, where he
took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and was discharged.
In the trial of an action of trespass, based upon these facts, the plaintiff claimed,
(1.) Actual damages resulting from his seizure and detention; (2.) Damages for
the indignity thereby suffered; and (3.) Punitive damages. Held:1. That the plaintiff was entitled to recover full pecuniary indemnity for the
actual corporeal injury received, and for tle actual damages directly resulting
therefrom, such as loss of time, expense of cure, and the like ;
2. That the declarations of the plaintiff, made prior to the unlawful arrest and
tending to provoke the same, not being a legal justification thereof, are inadmissible in mitigation of the actual damages; but,
3. That such declaration made on the same day, and communicated to the
defendants prior to such arrest, together with all the facts and circumstances fairly
and clearly connected with the arrest, indicative of the motives, provocations, and
conduct of both parties, are admissible upon the question of damages claimed upon
the other two grounds.

ON EXCEPTIONS.

The writ was dated June 15th 1867, and contained a declaration in trespass, substantially alleging that Elisha W. Shaw (a
deputy sheriff), Putnam Wilson, Jr.) Oliver B..Rowe, Hollis J.
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Rowe, and Daniel Dudley, on the 15th April 1865, at Newport,
with force and arms, assaulted, beat, and bruised the plaintiff,
thereby permanently injuring his hip and back, violently forcing
him into and locking him in a room in the Shaw House, subjecting
him to remain there five hours, violently taking from thence into
a carriage and carrying him against his will to the town-house in
Newport.
The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that in April
1865, while he'was at a blacksmith's shop in Newport, where he
was having his horses shod, Shaw, Dudley, Wilson, and H. J.
Rowe seized him, and forcibly putting him into a wagon, transported him a prisoner three miles distant, to Newport village, and
confined him for several hours in a room in the hotel there; that
a crowd of men accompanied the four defendants to the shop and
from thence to Newport village; that the four defendants inflicted
injuries upon the person of the plaintiff; and that threats of extreme personal injuries were made to the plaintiff, both at the
blacksmith shop and at Newport village, by some persons.
There was conflicting testimony as to the extent of the injuries
to the plaintiff's person.
The defendants, against the objections of the plaintiff, introduced evidence tending to show that the four defendants seized
the plaintiff in the forenoon of the day on which the news of the
assassination of President Lincoln was received; that when the
plaintiff stepped into the blacksmith shop he, addressing one
Gilman (who was a witness in this case), said: "He that draweth
the sword shall perish-by the sword, and their joy shall be turned
into mourning ;" that Gilman (alluding to the assassination of the
President) said to the plaintiff: "I suppose there are some who
are glad of it ;" that the plaintiff thereupon replied: "Yes; I
am glad of it; and there are fifty more in town who would say
so if they dared to ;" that Gilman rejoined that the plaintiff
would be glad to take those words back; that the plaintiff responded substantially that he would not; and that Gilman thereupon informed the plaintiff he should report him.
On cross-examination, Gilman testified that he thought that the
plaintiff, when speaking of the assassination, said it might stop
the further effusion of blood.
Against the objections of the plaintiff, the defendants also
introduced evidence tending to prove that the blacksmith shop
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was three miles from Newport village, where three of the defendants were; that Gilman, in about twenty minutes after his conversation with the plaintiff, told it to the defendant Wilson; that
Gilman and Wilson went to Newport village and informed the
four defendants of the plaintiff's declarations concerning the
assassination; that, about two hours afterwards, the four defendants proceeded to the blacksmith shop and did the act proved by
the plaintiff; that there was great excitement in the public mind
upon the receipt of the news of the assassination.
The plaintiff seasonably objected to the admission of the alleged
declarations of the plaintiff, made to Gilman that day; but the
presiding judge ruled that the plaintiff's declarations made that
day, concerning the assassination of the President, might be given
in evidence de bene esse, it liaving been stated by the defendants'
counsel that they should prove the same had been communicated
to the defendants before their arrest of the plaintiff.
Against the objections of the plaintiff, the defendants also
introduced evidence tending to prove that, after the confinement
of the plaintiff in the hotel, he was taken by them, on the same
day, to a public meeting of the citizens, called at the town-house,
at which a moderator and clerk were chosei, and acted officially;
that, at the meeting, a vote was passed that the plaintiff be discharged upon his taking an oath to support the Constitution of
the United States; and that the plaintiff voluntarily took such
oath and was thereupon discharged.
The defendants also introduced evidence tending to show, that,
before arresting the plaintiff, telegraphic communication, relative
to the plaintiff's declarations concerning the assassination, was
had with the provost-marshal at Bangor, who replied by telegraph,
that he should be arrested and held; that thereupon the defendant Shaw, then an acting deputy sheriff, with three other defendants, acting under his orders, proceeded to make the arrest; and
that they honestly believed that they had a legal right to do what
they did, and had no malice towards the plaintiff.
As to the four defendants proved to have been present (and
the other, if found to have participated), the presiding judge
instructed the jury that the defendants had shown no legal justification for their acts, and must be found guilty; that the only
question for the jury was the amount of damages ; that the plaintiff claims damages on three grounds:-
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1. For the actual injury to his person and'for his detention;
2. For the injury to his feelings, the indignity, and the public
exposure; and,
3. For punitive or exemplary damages.
That they were bound to give, at all events, damages to the
full extent for the injuries to the plaintiff's pei'son and for his"
detention..
That, as to damages for the second and third grounds, it was
for the jury.to determine, on the whole evidence, whether any
should be allowed, and the amount.
The presiding judge explained to the jury the nature and
.grounds of such damage, and instructed them, inter alia, that
they could only consider the evidence introduced by the defendants under the second and third heads above set forth, and in
mitigation of any damages they might find under either or both
of said heads, if, in their judgment, those facts did mitigate such
damages; but that they could not consider them under the first
head.
The jury acquitted 0. B. Rowe, and found a verdict of guilty
against the other defendants, and assessed damages in the sum of
$6.46. Whereupon the plaintiff alleged exceptions.
W. I. . eCrillis, for the plaintiff, contended, inter alia, that
the language of the plaintiff #Nas not a sufficient provocation. It
was not personal to any of the defendants: Ooning v. Corning, 2
Selden 97; -Ellsworthv. Thompson, 13 Wend. 658.
Sufficient provocation cannot be proved in mitigation when tne
assault and battery were deliberately .committed. The assault
must accompany the provocation before the blood has time to cool.
The question is, was there time for a reasonable man to reflect,
and ndt whether the defendants continued in a state of passion:
CoPe v. Sullivan' 3 Selden 400; Avery v. Bay, 1 Mass. 11; Lee
v. Woolsey, 19 Johns. 319; Willis v. Forrest, 2 Duer 318.
Words cannot constitute justification. Words can never be
sufficient provocation. They may provoke extreme anger, and
the anger be admitted in mitigation. But, if the blood has time
to cool, the assault is regarded as deliberately done and cannot be
mitigated. Any other rule would be subversive of the order of
society.
L. Barker, for the defendants.
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KENT, J.-The case, as presented to the jury under the rulings,
was, in substance and effect, one where a default had been entered
and an inquisition of damages had been allowed before a. jury.
The jury had no discretion allowed to them, except as to the
amount of damages to be inserted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
The main question is whether the directions given by the judge
to the jury to govern them in the assessment of damages were
correct.
The plaintiff claimed damages for several distinct matters, and
asked that the jury should found their verdict on these principles, viz. :1. The actual injury to his person and the detention and
imprisonment.
2. The injury to his feelihgs, the indignity and public exposure and contumely.
3. Punitive or exemplary damages in the nature of punishment, and as a warning to others not to offend in like manner.
The judge very unequivocally instructed the jury that the
defendants had shown no legal justification for their acts, and
must be found guilty, and that the only question for them was
the amount of damages,-that they were bound to give damages
at all events for the injuries to the plaintiff's person, and for
detention to the full extent of sai& damages; that they could not
consider the testimony put in by defendants in mitigation of such
actual damages, but must give a verdict for matters named under
the 1st head to the full amount proved without diminution, on
account of any matters of provocation, or in extenuation.
The judge further instructed the jury that they might consider
the testimony put in by defendants under the 2d and 3d heads,
above stated, in mitigation of any damages they might find the
plaintiff had sustained under either or both of said grounds.
These rulings present the question whether the evidence objected to was admissible for the special purpose to which it was
confined. It was not in the case generally, but its consideration
and application was restricted to the special grounds of damages
set up beyond what may properly be termed the actual damages.
It was entirely excluded as a justification, or as mitigating in any
degree the actual damages.
The distinctive points of the rulings which pei'haps distinguish
them from some cases in the reports, and some doctrines in the
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text-books, are, first, that they exclude entirely this species of
evidence in mitigation of actual damages,-and, secondly, that
they admit it in mitigation of damages, claimed on the other
grounds of injury to the feelings, indignity, and punitive damages, although the evidence related to matters which did not
transpire at the instant of the assault, but on the same day, and
manifestly connected directly with the infliction of the injury
complained of.
It is unquektionable that many authorities can be found which
seem to negative the proposition that acts or words of provocation, except those done or uttered at the moment, or immediately
connected in time with the infliction of the injury, can be given
in evidence in mitigation of damages. But most of these cases
seem to be predicated upon the idea of mitigation of the positive,
visible damages,-those damages to which the party would be
entitled on account of the actual injury to his person or his
property.
It is important to settle, as well as we can, the general principle which lies at the foundation of the law applicable to damages,
occasioned by the illegal acts of the defendant. We understand
that rule to be this-a party shall recover, as a pecuniary recompense, the amount of money which shall be a remuneration, as
near as may be, for the actual, tangible, and immediate result,
injury, or consequence of the trespass to his person or property.
But, in the application of this general principle, there has been
great diversity in the decisions, and in the doctrines to be found
in the text-books touching the point of mitigation or extenuation.
In reference to injuries to the person, it was soon seen that
this literal and limited rule, if applied inexorably, would fail to
do justice. The case is at once suggested, where an assault and
battery is shown to have been wanton, unprovoked, and grossly
insulting; inflicted clearly for the purpose of disgracing the
recipient, and at such a time or place as would give publicity to
the act, and yet the actual injury to the person very slight, or
hardly appreciable. Shall the law, in such a case of wanton
insult and injury, give only the damages to the face or the person, as testified to by a surgeon ?
On the other hand, a case is suggested, where the injury to the
person was severe, a broken limb or grievous wounds, or permanent or partial disability, and yet the party suffering had been

PRENTISS v. SHAW.

guilty of gross abuse, provoking the assault by insulting language
or false accusations, or most offensive libels upon the defendant
or his family, or had outraged the community in which he lived,
by a-series of acts or declarations which justly aroused and kept
alive the indignation, which at last found vent in the infliction of
some personal indignity, accompanied by force and violence, which
resulted in the serious manner above stated. What is the rule as
to such damages, applied to the aggravations in the one case, and
the mitigations in the other ?
If we take the case of such an assault, which has been provoked by words or acts at the time of the trespass, and so immediately connected therewith that all authorities would agree in
admitting the evidence in mitigation, the precise question then
is, for what purpose can it be used, and what damages can it
mitigate?
All agree that these facts cannot be a legal justification, and
be used in bar of the action. The plaintiff is undoubtedly entitled to a verdict, with damages. It is said these facts may be
used to mitigate the damages. But what damages? If the
assault was illegal and unjustified, why is not the plaintiff, in such
case, entitled to the benefit of the general rule, before stated--7that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on another's person or
property, must pay all the damages to such person or property,
directly and actually resulting from the illegal act ? Admit that
the defendant was provoked, insulted, irritated, and justly indignant at the acts or language of the plaintiff. If those provocations did not reach the point of a legal justification of the assault,
then, so far as the question arises for which party the verdict
shall be given, they are immaterial, and out of the case. The
assault was wholly legal or wholly illegal. There can be no such
thing as apportioning the guilt; making the act half legal and
half illegal. It is not one of the class of cases where the suffering. party, contributed to the injury, and thereby lost his right of
action. The contribution, to work that effect, must be co-operation in the doing of the act itself, which is complained of,-i. e.,
the assault and battery; or whatever the alleged specific act
may be.
If then the act is confessedly an illegal one, and unjustified in
law, why must not the defendant answer for and pay the actual
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damages to the person? On what principle of law can he be
exonerated ?
In the case before us the presiding judge took this view. He
made a distinction which has not often been attended to, between
a recovery for the actual personal damage and loss of time and
other direct injuries, and a recovery for other damages based on
injury to the feelings, indignity, insults, and the like, and also on
the claim for punitive damages.
Is there not such a distinction in law and common sense? Take
the simple case of the meeting of two men in a public street.
One addresses the other with opprobrious and insulting language,
calling him a thief or a liar. The other, at the moment, naturally
excited to almost uncontrollable anger, strikes a blow which
breaks the arm of his antagonist. The law says the words were
no legal justification for the blow. It was therefore a trespass
and a wrong. What damages shall be awarded? Can they be
more or less, according to the provocation on one side or the
natural anger on the other? There is the broken arm, neither
more nor less, with the pain and suffering and expense of cure,
and the loss of time, all which are open and appreciable, and
are the direct and immediate consequences of the legal wrong.
If the law holds, as it does, sternly and unwaveringly, that the
words are no excuse or justification, why should it "keep the
word of promise to the ear but break it to the hope," by allowing
a jury to evade the law, whilst in form keeping it by a verdict for
nominal damages, which is in effect one in favor of the defendant?
Why not say rather .that the provocation might be shown in
defence of the action, and that if the plaintiff morally deserved to
suffer the injury by reason of his language, that should be a legal
excuse? It seems to be a legal anomaly to say, true, it is an
undefended, naked trespass and wrong, but no real damages or
recompense shall be given. It is giving the benefit of a justification. to what the law expressly says is no justification. The
restriction of the rule to the provocation given at the time of the
assault, does not obviate the objection that it is against a wellsettled principle which gives real and substantial redress for every
unjustified trespass. Where the trespass or injury is upon personal or real property it would be a novelty to hear a claim for
reduction of the actual injury based on the ground of provocation
by words. If, instead of the owner's arm, the assailait had
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broken his horse's leg, in the case before stated, must not the
defendant be held to pay the full value of the horse thus rendered
useless? Or in case of trespass on land, can the actual damage
be -mitigated by showing that it was provoked by unfriendly or
unneighborly words? Or in case of a damage at sea, could an
intentional and unnecessary collision be mitigated, so far as the
actual injury was in question, by proving that the navigator was
insulted and irritated by taunting and exciting language from the
deck of the injured vessel ?
But there is no doubt that the law has sanctioned, by a long
series of decisions, the admission of evidence tending to show on
one side aggravation, and on the other, mitigation of the damages
claimed. Verdicts for heavy damages have been sustained where
the actual injury to the person was very slight or merely constructive, and other verdicts for merely nominal damages have
been confirmed where the actual injuries were shown to have been
serious. In the first class of such cases the plaintiff has not been
restricted to proof of the injury to the person, but has been
allowed to show the circumstances attending the act, and to have
damages for the insult, indignity, injury to his feelings, and for
the wanton malice and unprovoked maligriity of the deed. And
it is now settled, certainly in this state, that he may be allowed,
in addition, exemplary damages in the way of punishment or
warning to the transgressor and others.
Now this opens a wide field for uncertain or speculative damages
for matters not tangible or susceptible of accurate estimation, but
based upon principles and considerations different from those
which determine the actual injuries as before described. These
are such as lie patent, and require only a calculation of time lost,
pain suffered, or the value of a permanently injured limb, or the
like. But when the injury to the feelings, the insult, the mortification, the wounded pride, or, to sum up all in one word, the
indignity, are pressed as grounds for pecuniary indemnity, superadded to the claim for punitive and exemplary damages, they evidently and necessarily require a consideration of all the facts in
any way clearly and fairly connected with the trespass, and bearing upon the motives, provocations, and conduct of both parties
in the controversy, which has culminated in an assault by one
upon the other. How otherwise can a jury fairly estimate what
shouldibe awarded by way of punishment, or as a reasonable satis-
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faction for injured feelings? These damages, as our law now
stands, are made up of injuries partly private and partly public
in their nature. If evidence of this nature, admitted to enhance
the actual damages to the person, may be given, why should not
the same kind of evidence be given by way of mitigation of damages claimed on such grounds?
If the plaintiff restricts himself distinctly to the single claim
for the actual damages 'to his person, and the direct, tangible
results therefrom; and expressly waives all claim beyond, it would
seem that the defendant should be limited to matters strictly in
defence or justification of his act, as in other cases of trespass.
But'if, as in this case, he claims beyond this, for injured feelings
and for punishment, the question arises (which is the main question made by the plaintiff), what is the limit of the evidence which
may be adniitted in mitigation or extenuation ? It is not denied
that some evidence of this nature is admissible. The precise question is whether it is to be confined to what transpired at the time
of, or in immediate connection with the act. If a party claims
damages not merely for the naked assault, but for his wounded
feelings, and seeks to inflame them by showing that he had been
publicly insulted by opprobrious language used with the evident
intent to degrade him in the eyes of his fellow-citizens may not
the defendant be allowed to show that the complainant had himself been guilty of using like words, or by his conduct and by
insults and provocations had really been the cause of the assault ?
The plaintiff may have been passive and silent at the moment of
the assault, whilst the defendant was violent and denunciatory,
and, if no facts can be shown beyond those transpiring at that
meeting, the plaintiff would present a case, apparently calling for
exemplary damages, whilst, if the whole truth was brought out,
the defendant would appear the least in fault, so far as regards
provocation.
And so, if the plaintiff claims for damages of this nature, for
an assault, not by a personal enemy, but by those whose indignation had been aroused in matters of a general and public nature,
,may not all damages, beyond those actually suffered in his person,
be modified or affected by evidence of his acts or declarations,
calculated to arouse a just indignation and disgust? Why should
the man who has intentionally and grossly outraged decency, or
aroused indignation by his violation of common humanity, be
VOL. XVIL-46
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allowed to recover for *his injured feelings, and the public degradation to which he has been subjected ? Or rather, why should
not a jury be allowed to know all the facts, directly connected
with the act, although not transpiring at the moment, and from
them determine, whether any, and if any, what damages should
be allowed beyond the actual injury to the person or property ?
If facts beyond the act are to be allowed to.aggravate, why should
not like facts be allowed to mitigate this class of damages ? Where,
for instance, a man had been guilty of frequent, indecent exposures of his person in public streets, accompanied by obscene
language and gross insults to females, and had persisted in such a
course, until a body of his townsmen, indignant and outraged,
seized him and inflicted punishment, and carried him away and
confined him for a day, or other like proceedings; and for this
assault and battery and imprisonment an action is brought and a
claim set up for recompense for injured feelings, indignity and for
punitive damages. At the trial, he proves these acts,-rough
handling, and degrading treatment, and personal imprisonment,
and makes out a case of apparently inexcusable interference with
his liberty and his person, and his sense of self-respect. The
defendants cannot show that he did or said anything at the time
of the arrest. But are they to be precluded from showing anything in mitigation of such a claim? The law is fully vindicated
when it gives such a man his full, actual damages. When he asks
for more, he opens a new ground for his opponent, who may well
say you have no fair claim for damages on this ground, for your
own conduct and language aroused the indignation which led to
the acts complained of.
There is an instinct, or, if not quite' that, a dictate of common
sense, which it is neither wise, or hardly possible for the law to
disregard,-that a man should not have pecuniary recompense for
injured feelings or public degradation, When he has himself outraged the feelings of another, or so conducted as justly to excite
public odium by open contempt of the decencies of life. The old
legal requirement, that he that asks for redress " must come into
court with clean hands," at once occurs to us. The law will protect the hand from actual violence upon it, although it may sadly
need ablution, but beyond this will require "a show of hands"
before it will adjudge damages for an alleged defilement.
The ruling of the judge, in this case, was peremptory and
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unqualified, that the evidence made out no legal defence, and that
the verdict must be for the plaintiff "to the full extent of the
damages sustained by the injuries to the plaintiff's person, and
for detention."
If, after this ruling, the defendant had consented to a default,
and the case had come before a judge to determine the damages,
and the same claim for cumulative and exemplary damages had
been made and pressed, would any judge have excluded, in the
hearing before him, the evidence offered in this case ? If he had,
how could he determine the degrees of aggravation or extenuation, or come to any satisfactory conclusion on the matter of damages ? As before said, the jury in this case were in the same
condition, after the ruling, as a judge would have been after
default.
When we consider the nature and the grounds of this claim for
exemplary or punitive damages, it is difficult to see why the evidence of provocation' or mitigation, if allowed at all, should be
restricted to the time of the overt act. What happened then
may, and generally would, give a very partial and insufficient
view of all the'circumstances which in truth belong to the matter
in question, and serve to aggravate or diminish the injury to the
feelings, or the malice of the act. Every one sees, this at a
glance.
We think it will be found, on a careful examination of the
cqses, that where this rule, limiting the evidence to what transpirbd at the moment, has been enforced, the claim was to diminish
the damages for the actual corporeal injury and loss of time, and
no distinction was made between those and exemplary damages.
The reasoning to be found in this class of cases is very similar to
that found in the decisions at common law, where the degree of
guilt is lessened, and a different and distinct offence, of a less
degiee, is found by reason of proof of sudden and provoked
anger; as where a homicide is reduced from murder to manslaughter. But, in such trials, these matters of provocation and
sudden anger are introduced, not to mitigate a crime found
or admitted, but are strictly matters in defence, and modify or
give character to the act, in determining what crime has been in
fact committed, and are used for that purpose. In such case it
becomes iportant to know whether the act was the result of
sudden passion, or whether there had been time for the passions
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to cool. But in a civil action for trespass the liability of the
party for actual damages does not depend upon the intent or state
of mind of the trespasser. He may be liable, if his act was
unlawful, although he did not intend to injure any one, and had
no anger or ill-will towards the party whose person or property
was affected by his illegal act. It is not the motive, or the feelings under which the legal wrong is committed, which determines
the character of the act, or the amount of the actual damages
resulting from it. It cannot be excused, if legally unjustified,
by proof of sudden passion, or the absence of malice or wrong
intent.
The analogy, if an-y, between civil actions and criminal prosecutions, is to be found in the determination of the extent of
punishment in the one, and the amount of exemplary or cumulative damages in the other. Although in the trial of criminal
cases the evidence may be limited to the time of the occurrence,
yet every judge is aware that, in fixing upon the sentence to be
awarded, he does not hesitate to hear evidence or statements as to
facts and acts and declarations made or done anterior to such
time-in order to ascertain, as well as he can, the mitigating or
aggravating circumstances connected with the offence. So, indetermining the amount of damages in a civil suit, beyond the
tangible, as before explained-when there is no question as to the
fact that a trespass has been committed, a limitation of the examination into what transpired at the moment would seem to fall
far short of what reason and common sense would prescribe. *It
seems hardly just to require any tribunal to act and determine
such questions, and to award damages in the nature of punishment,
and withhold from it all knowledge of the facts which may fairly
be said to give the. moral character of the act, and the actual
guilt of the respondent.
We are aware that great care must be taken to confine the
examination to such matters as are clearly and directly connected
with the acts, or give color or character to it. Mere evidence of
general bad character,-or unpopularity, or of acts or ,declarations of ancient date, or not clearly and really part and parcel
of the matter in question, must be excluded. But time is not of
the essence of the principle, but fairly established -direct connection, as cause or effect. It is impossible to accurately define the
limits, so as to reach every case. But there can be ifo greater

PRENTISS v. SHAW.

difficulty in the application of this than of many other rules of
law.
In the case at bar, the evidence was limited to the transactions
of the day on which the assault was committed, and very evidently
was of matters connected directly with the acts done. If it had
been excluded, after the evidence on the part of the plaintiff had
been heard, how could the jury have properly or understandingly
determined what punitive damages should be given in vindication
of outraged law, or for the indignity and injury to the feelings?
They had a right to know, and the defendants had a right to place
befo.re them the true relations of the parties, and to show how far
the act was wanton, malicious, vindictive, or unprovoked, or how
far extenuated by the conduct, declarations, or provocations of the
complaining party.

On the whole, after a full consideration of the case, and the
cases, we think that the rulings of the judge were not erroneous,
but give the rules on this subject which are practical, and in
accordance with common sense and the general principles of the

law.
Exceptions overruled.
CUTTING, DICKERSON, BARROWS, and TAPLEY, JJ., concurred.

-

This is one of that class of cases,
where there existed at the time it occurred, and even at the present time, to
some extent, there exists, a degree of
unfairness, in judgment and opinion,
which renders it extremely difficult to
say anything which will be kindly received, or candidly weighed. But we
feel compelled to say, that the facts of
this case, placed beside the verdict of
$6.46, certainly do indicate a substantial failure of the suit, if not of justice. The jury must have treated the
evidence given in mitigation of damages,
as a substantial justifibation of the assault, battery, and false imprisonment,
with all its incidents of humiliation and
outrage. The verdict very clearly manifests an opinion in the mind of the court
and jury, that the plaintiff was more in
fault than the defendants-in short, that
the conduct of the plaintiff was repre-

hensible, and that of the defendants
excusable-and that, therefore, it was
proper for the court to place its stigma
upon the action. This is not said, indeed, in so many words, but it is fairly
implied.
This is a result to which courts of
justice should never come, except in the
most unquestionable cases, where there
is no pretence of anything more than a
nominal- breach of the law, and where
the action is therefore clearly vexatious.
And it is especially unbecoming for
courts to fall into this view, out of respect for, or sympathy with, or dread of,
an intensified partisan public opinion.
It is the duty and the business of courts,
to hold the scales of justice evenly and
firmly between the most embittered partisans of contending factions in the
state, when such become suitors before
them.
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We might better have no courts, than
to have them echo the varying surges of
an ever-changing and baseless public
sentiment. In a case like the present,
it would be far better to have the court
instruct the jury, in so many words,
that the plaintiff's disregard of the common courtesies and decencies of life,
justified the defendants in inflicting such
punishment upon him, as would teach
him not to repeat the offence, and to
conduct with more circumspection in
the future, than to have left the case
to the jury, in such a slipshod way, as
to bring about the same result exactly,
but without any technical violation of
the rules of law. And we must say, it
seems to us that the charge of the court
below, and the opinion of the full court,
although clearly not so intended, must
have operated in that direction.
Possibly some may claim, that upon
a nice construction, there was no error
in law, and all agree that courts cannot
be expected always to control the waywardness or the prejudices of juries.
But this is generally urged, where courts
desire to throw their own responsibility
upon the irresponsibility of tie jury.
And it seems to us the charge to the
jury, in this case, afforded the jury an
excellent opportunity to punish the
plaintiff, and at the same time to compliment the defendants for taking the
plaintiff in hand, and applying the rules
of Lynch law to him, in the summary
mode they did. This was all very well,
provided it were the business of courts
to administer Lynch law, or to moderate
the strictness of the existing law. But
as that is not the fact, but the contrarv,
it seems a peculiarly unfortunate distinction which the court have attempted
to make in this case, between compensatory and exemplary damages, and to
allow of the mitigation of one and not
of the other.
If there be, in fact, any such distinction in the law, it should certainly be

differently stated from uhat it seems to
have been in the trial of this case, or it
would be very likely to he misapplied
by the jury, as it certainly was here.
The error in the charge seems to be
in treating 11the injury to the plaintiff's
feelings, the indignity and the public
exposure," as forming no part of the
actual damages in the action. Nothing
could be further from the truth; since
these things not only constitute a portion of the actual damages, but the principal portion. It is scarcely possible to
conceive any proposition more unjust or
unreasonable-not to say absurd-than
to suppose that in a transaction like that,
through which the plaintiff was dragged
by the defendants, that the actual ''injury to his person and his detention"
embraced all for which he was entitled
to compensation under the head of actual
damages.
It is not probable, indeed, that the
plaintiff was of that delicate organization, that. he would be likely to suffer
any irreparable damage merely from the
insult and indignity, for if so, he could
not have said what he did. But there
are many persopns who, from similar
treatment, might have been ruined for
life; and the rule of law is the same in
all such cases. And there is no case,
except the present, so far as we have
noticed, which attempts to discriminate
between corporeal and external injuries,
and those which affect the sensibilities.
These latter, are those which form the
chief ingredient of damages in this class
of actions. If these latter are to be excluded from consideration, or justifietd
by public sentiment, there might better
come an end of all pretence of the administration of justice. It is the direct
and sure mode of encouraging a resort
to force for remedy and redress.
We know that some very able writers,
and among them the late Prof. Greenleaf (2 Evidence, 253 and n. et seq.),
contend for the rule, that in no case are
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exemplary or punitive damages to be profession, and especially the courts, in
given, but that in all cases they should this country, that the high privilege of
he confined to making compensation to
the plaintiff. But no writer, or judge,
to our knowledge, has ever before attempted to limit the actual damages to
which the plaintiff was in all cases entitled by way of compensation, to loss of
time and injury to the person, in cases
oftrespass and false imprisonment. Mr.
Sedgwick (Dam. 605, n. 1), says, that
"all rules, or rather definite principles
of damages in civil actions, must be referred either to compensation or punishment." No one, we suppose, would for
a moment deny that the plaintiff, in an
action of this character, is entitled to
recover damages for "1the injury to his
feelings, the indignity, and the public
exposure ;" and it would seem to be
equally improbable, that any one should
hold, that such damages were in the
nature of punishment to the defendant,
and only recoverable under that head.
The truth unquestionably is, in the
present case, that the court have mistaken the application of their'own rule,
and thus, as it seems to us, have presented the whole case in a most unfortunate aspect-very much in that of an
excuse and an apology, if not a full justification of Lynch law, than which nothing could have been further from its
intention.
We hope no one will be simple enough
to suppose that we feel any other than
the most unqualified disgust and contempt for such sentiments as were expressed by the plaintiff, on the occurrence of the most disgraceful, as well as
the most unfortunate event, which has
ever occurred in our past history. The
only possible mode of accounting for
such folly, in speech, is that folly on one
side naturally leads to counter folly upon
the other, and despotic public opinion
naturally provokes foolish words. But
we trust it is not needful to inform the

free speech is not created, or maintained,
for the exclusive, or the chief benefit of
wise and discreet men. They will do
very well without any such protection.
But it is intended for the protection of
every class of the most ranting fools,
and the vilest blackguards, and the most
infamous blasphemers, except as they
are liable to some restraint by the firm
and wise administrators of the criminal
and civil law of the land. These are
the only men who require protection at
the hands of the administrators of the
law; and when we allow ourselves to be
cheated with the delusion that the simple
and degraded, or the offensive and
coarse-grained, do not deserve the highest protection of the law, we approach
a point of timeserving, which is but one
degree removed from actual corruption,
of which we already begin to hear
charges, in some quarters, but we trust
wholly without foundation.
We regret, in this case, the affirmance
of the principles of the charge in the
court below by a court of such high character, although done in a mode, and
for reasons, which show the high dignity
and purity of the tribunal, and do also
show, as it appears to us, that an unfortunate misapplication of the very
principle upon which the case is decided, must have occurred in the court
below.
We know the learning and
ability of the court from which the
decision comes; and we are always.
proud to welcome its members among
our most esteemeff friends; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that the
substantial damages in this action were
blinked out of sight, and disregarded
by the jury, upon grounds which are
flagrantly in violation of the leading
doctrine of the decision, viz., that actual
and compensatory damages cannot be
denied upon any ground of provocation
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short of an actual justification of the
assault, battery, and false imprisonment,
which was not attempted in this action.
The testimony offered and received in
mitigation of damages in this action,
might well enough have been received,
upon the question of punitive or exemplary damages, but it was not of a very
satisfactory character upon that head
even.
The only portion of it which
seems to afford any just apology for the
flagrant misconduct of the defendants,
was the stupid blunder of the provostmarshal in directing the plaintiff to be
This had some fair ten"detained."
dency to vindicate the good faith of the
defendants in arresting the plaintiff.
But what can be said of their after-conduct in forcibly carrying the plaintiff
three miles, and dragging him before a
town meeting, and sentencing him to
take an oath to support the Constitution
of the United States ? They might, with
the same propriety, have sentenced him
to be hanged, or burned to death. And
if they had done so and carried the sentence into execution, and been indicted
for murder, they should, so far as we
can see, upon the principle of this decision, have been permitted to show the
plaintiff's provoking bravado talk in
mitigation of punishment-or possibly
to reduce the verdict from murder to
manslaughter.
It does not seem to us that such evidence should have been permitted to go
to the jury, upon either the first or
second point made in the plaintiff's re-

quest to charge, and not upon the third,
except so far as it tended to show that
the defendants acted under a misapprehension of the law, and in good faith;
for punitive or exemplary damages are
not given with any reference to the plaintiff's misconduct, within the limits of
the law, but solely on account of the
malice and wanton misconduct of the
defendants, and to admonish them, and
others in like case, not to repeat the misconduct. Is there anything in the plaintiff's folly and bravado, naturally calculated to induce the defendants to believe
they had any legal right to deal with
him in the manner they did? Was not
then the charge of the court, and the
result of the trial, directly calculated to
encourage such abuses of right, such
flagrant breaches of the law? Was not
the conduct of the defendants malicious,
wanton, and intentionally insulting and
abusive? Can there be more than one
opinion on these subjects? And was
not the charge in the court below, the
verdict of the jury, and the overruling
of the exceptions, all calculated to encourage such conduct, and to discourage
such actions ? If.so, can we fairly expect parties suffering like indignities to
appeal to the tribunals for redress? And
will not the result of such experiences,
in courts of justice, sooner or later, end
in a resort to force in all such cases?
These are plain questions, but they are
fundamental to the very existence of
free states and private liberty, both of
I. F. R.
person and speech.

GILLIS v. RAILROAD CO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
GILLIS v. THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO. 1
The platform of a railroad company at a station is in no sense a public highway.
There is no dedication to public use as such.
The platform is for the accommodation of passengers, and being unenclosed, persons have" the privilege but have not the legal right of walking over it for other
purposes.
The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser or to one who is on it by
mere permission or sufferance, for negligence of himself or. servants, or for that
which would be a nuisance in a public street or common.
To persons who come on to a platform to meet or part with passengers, or who
stand in such relation to the company as requires care, the company is hound to
have the structure strong enough to bear all who could stand upon it.
The owner is bound to have the approach to his house sufficient for all visitors
on business or otherwise, but if a crowd gathers on it to witness a passing parade,
&c., and it breaks down, though not sufficient for its ordinary use, he is not liable
to one of the crowd who might be injured.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria county.
This was an action on the case for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff by the breaking down of a platform of the defendants
at the Johnstown station, Cambria county.
The declaration contained four counts. The first count charged
that the defendants, being a corporation for conveying freight and
passengers, and having the sole control of'the passenger depots,
platforms, &c., along the road for the mutual accommodation of
themselves and the public, built a platform at the Johnstown
station, bridging a chasm over the bed of an abandoned canal, on
which large numbers of people were in the habit of congregating,
"as a matter of general custom;" and it was the duty of the
defendant to construct the platform so as to make it safe and keep
it in good repair; that it had come to the knowledge of the defendants that the timbers of the platform were rotten, and " insufficient to support a large multitude of people;" but that they
notwithstanding insufficiently repaired it; that on the 14th of
September 1866, "on the occasion of the visit of Andrew Johnson, President, &c., and suite, to Johnstown," the defendants fur-'
nished a special train, and made a special time-schedule for their
accommodation, by which the train was required to stop a longer
I We are indebted for this case to P. F. Smith, Esq., State Reporter.-ED.
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time than usual for passenger trains at Johnstown, &c., tLe company notifying the people at Johnstown and vicinity of the time
of arrival and departure of the train at Johnstown, the stoppages
being made by the direction of the defendants to give the people
an opportunity of receiving Mr. Johnson and hearing him; that
it had been publicly made known that wherever Mr. Johnson and
his company had stopped large numbers of people congregated,
and thereupon it became the duty of the defendants "to have the
platform aforesaid made sufficiently strong to bear and uphold as
many people as might congregate thereon on the occasion aforesaid ;" that the defendants, knowing the insecure condition of the
platform, did not use due diligence to have it made secure, but
permitted and invited ''a large multitude of people to congregate"
thereon without notifying them or the plaintiff of its insecure
condition; that the platform broke and precipitated the multitude
with the plaintiff into the chasm, by which he was injured and
wounded. The second count averred that the company carried
Mr. Johnson and his party by agreement and for hire, and that
the platform was part of the company's highway; the count was
otherwise substantially as the first. The fourth count averred that
the plaintiff went to the station on the occasion of Mr. Johnson's
visit, at the defendants' special instance and request; that the
train was not stopped at the usual place of stopping, but about
two hundred yards beyond it, without giving notice to the people
assembled, and to the plaintiff., and that the "plaintiff and the
multitude were compelled to change their position to get a better
view of the party," thereby causing them to congregate more
numerously "on the insecure part of the platform ;"-otherwise
substantially as in the first count. The third count averred that
the plaintiff was a passenger on the train, and got off the train on
to the platform which broke, &c.
The facts necessary for an understanding of this case appear
to .be substantially the following:At or near the Johnstown station of the defendants, their railroad crosses the canal constructed by the state, at an angle of
about 25 degrees-the canal being now abandoned; the passenger station and its platform are further west than the canal; eastwardly of this platform is a township bridge over the canal ; that
part of the canal between the railroad track and the township bridge
is also planked over, making a continuous platform from the passen-
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ger station to the track and the township bridge. On the 14th
of September 1866, Mr. Johnson and his party were coming from
Pittsburg, on their way from Chicago, on a special train of the
defendants, which was provided without compencation. The train
was running on a special time-schedule, and at the request of Mfr.
Johnson, or some of his party, it was arranged that it should stop
about five minutes at each of several points along the road,
Johnstown amongst others, that the people might have an opportunity of seeing and saluting them. It was generally known
through the newspapers that the party would pass Johnstown on
that day, but no previous notice of the time of the arrival of the
train had been given by the company. A clerk in the telegraph
office, however, mentioned the time in a printing-office in Johnstown, and before the arrival of the train handbills had been posted
through the town announcing the precise time of arrival, and a
very large crowd of people assembled at the station and on the
platform. The train at first stopped at the usual place near the
passenger station, but it being supposed that in that position the
people would not have a good opportunity to see and hear Ar.
Johnson and his party, who were on the hindmost car, the train
was immediately moved a short distance further east. The crowd
pressed onwards, collecting in very great numbers near the hindmost car, on that part of the platform over the canal, when the
platform gave way and all on it, with the plank and broken timbers,
were precipitated into the canal, a depth of about twenty feet.
The plaintiff was amongst those who thus fell. Two or three were
instantly killed; some died afterwards from the effects of the fall,
and many were more or less seriously injured. The plaintiff was
badly hurt. He brought this suit to recover damages for the
injuries then received.
There was no evidence at all on the 3d count, the defendant
not having been on any passenger train of the defendants that
day.
The court below directed the jury to find a verdict for defendants.
A. Kopelin and B. J. Johnston (with whom was AD. teLaughlin), for plaintiff in error.-The defendants were bound to use
their property so as not to endanger others: Broom's Leg. Max.
257. Had the plaintiff been a trespasser it would not have
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excused the defendant's negligence: 2 Redfield 193, 194; 'Mayne
on Damages 4, 44; Pierce on Railways 285; G. & C. Railway
v. Terry, 8 Ohio 570; Birge v. Gardner,19 Conn. R. 507; Bird
v. Holbrook, 4 fBing. 628 Brown v. Lynn, 7 Casey 510. There
was negligence in keeping the platform in the condition in which
it was, and the question whether there was concurring negligence
was for the jury: 0. f .11'. B. B. v. Gullett, 15 Ind. St. R. 487.
Public policy requires that railroad companies should construct
and keep their roads and appurtenances as well for the public
interest as their own: Pierce on Railways 229; Bank of Pittsburg v. Whitehead, 10 Watts 402; Kemmerer v. Edelman, 11
Harris 143; Bush v. Johnston, Id. 209; Holmes v. Watson, 5
Casey 457; Fisher v. Knox, 1 Harris 625; Pittsburg v. G-rier,
10 Id. 54; Id. 384; 1 Redfield on Railways 603-607; Pierce on
Railways 244, 245, 487, 488. Railroad companies must keep
their platforms in a safe condition for those who are on them
either by their direct permission or through contract with others:
Sawyer v. B. & B. Railway, 27 Vt. Rep. 377; .31arshallv. .,
N. f B. B. B., 11 C. B. 655; Gerhard v. Bates, 20 Eng. L. &
Eq. 129; Broome on Com. Law 661, 679; -Davisv. Plank Boad
Co., 27 Vt. 602; G. N. Railway v. Harrison, 14 Eng. L. & Eq.
189; P. & B. B. v. -Derby, 14 How. 480; C. V,. B. v. Hughes,
1 Jones 141 ; Carson v. Godley, 2 Casey 111; Grier v. Sampson,
3 Id. 183; -Elliottv. Pray, 10 Allen 378. No "privity need be
shown: Pierce on Railways 270; Henderson v. Penna. B., 1 P.
F. Smith 325; Sweeny v. 0. C. J- N. R., 10 Allen 368; Corby
v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556. The platform was dedicated to public use: Banks v. S. Y. Railway, 32 Law J. Q. B. 26. One
undertaking an act by which the conduct of others may be properly governed, is bound to do it so that no one will suffer by his
negligence: Sweeny v. 0. C. &"N. B., supra; Story on Bailments
11; Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1, 372, 582-589; Smith on Contracts 185; 1 Smith's Leading Cases 244; Coggs v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Raym. 909; 1 Redfield on Railways 194, note 6, 604; Thomas v. Winchester, 2 Selden 397. When the gist of the action
is negligence it is a question for the jury: 1 Redfield on Railways 544, 545; Pierce on Railways 282; 2 Hilliard on Torts
898, 409; Beatty v. Gilmore, 4 Harris 463; Beach v. Parmeter,
11 Id. 196; L. & B. B. Co. v. Chenowith, 2 P. F. Smith 382;
MeGrew v. Stone, 3 Id. 436. Opening depots and platforms is
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prim& facie a license to all to enter, and the entry is not a trespass: Pierce on Railways 251, &c.; Com. v. Power, 7 Met. 596;
Hall v. Power, 12 Id. 482; 1 Redfield on Railways 94. The defendants should have anticipated the gathering and provided
against accident: Jones v. Bird, 5 B. & A. 83V; Beers v. Housatonie B. Co., 19 Conn. 566, 569; Park v. O'Brien, 28 Id. 847;
0. 4. H1.B. v. Gullett, supra; Burnham v. City of Boston, 10
Allen 290; -Elliottv. Pray, Id. 378; Sweeny v. 0. C. & N. B.
Co., supra. A trespasser even would recover under such circumstances: Mayne on Damages 42,43; MIcCullyv. Clarke, 4 Wright
899. The case should have been submitted to the jury: 8 Bl.
Com. 379; Sedgwick on Statutory and Oonst. Law 542.

C. L. Pershing and J. Scott, for defendants in error.-There
was no contract relation which imposed any duty on the defendants: B. B. Co. v. Skinner, 7 Harris 298; B. B. Co. v. ffummell,
8 Wright 377; B. B. Co. v. Norton, 12 Harris 465; Kelly v.
Penna. B. B. Co., 7 Casey 872; Knight v. Abert, 6 Barr 472;
Barker v. Midland B., 86 Eng. L. & Eq. 258; Pickford v.
Grand Junction B., 8 M. & W. 372; Lucas v. T. &_N. B. B.,
6 Gray 66; Brand v. T. 4- S. B., 8 Barb. 878; ygo v. Newbold,
9 Exch., Rep. 802 ; Binks v. . YB. Co., 32 Law Jour. N. S.
26; Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; Com. v. Power,
7 Metc. 602; Hall v. Power, 12 Id. 485; Hfeil v. Glanding, 6
Wright 493; Brooks v. Buffalo B. B., 25 Barb. 600. The defendants are not within the maxim sic utere tuo, &c.: Sweeny
v. 0. C. & N. B., supra; Southeote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247;
Howland v. Vincent, "10 Metc. 371, 1 Rol. Ab. 88; Adams v.
Beeves, 11 Barb. 398. The defendants were not bound to keep
the platform more than sufficient for their ordinary business:
Withers v. N. K. B., 3 H. & N. 971; Blyth v. Birmingham W.
Works, 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 506, P., Ft. W. 4. C. R., 3 P. F.
Smith 512. The court properly ruled the case as a question of
law: 1 Redfield on Railways 546; Catawissa B. B. v. Armstrong, 2 P. F. Smith 282.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARswooD, J.-The platform of a railroad company at its station or stopping-place is in no sense a public highway. There is
no dedication to public use as such. It is a structure erected
expressly for the accommodation of passengers arriving and
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departing in the train. Being unenclosed, persons are allowed
the privilege of walking over it for other purposes, but they have
no legal right to do so. The servants of the company, after
requesting them to leave, can remove them by whatever force may
be necessary: Barker v. The Midland .Railway Co., 18 C. B. 46;
Corinth v. Power, 7 Mete. 596; Hall v. Power, 12 Id. 485; Harris
v. Stevens, 81 Verm. 79. Still, even a trespasser on the land of
another can maintain an action for a wanton or intentional injury
inflicted on him by the owner. It will appear on an examination
of the interesting and elaborate discussion in the English courts
of the question whether an action could be supported by such a
trespasser for personal harm occasioned ly a spring-gun, mantrap or dog-spike, set on the grounds of the defendant, in which
it was determined that where there was no proper warning given,
such an action well lies, that it was rested mainly on the ground
that a tian cannot lawfully do indirectly that which it is unlawful
for him to do directly. He cannot shoot or maiin or set a ferocious dog upon a mere trespasser. He shall not then place a
cohcealed machine where it will be likely to do the same thing, or
let such a dog loose in his grounds without warning: -Deane v.
Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489; .Tlott v. Wilkes, 3 B. & Ald. 304; Bird
v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628. It is, however, equally well settled
that the owner of property is not liable to a trespasser, or to one
who is on it by mere permission or sufferance, for negligence of
himself or servants, or for that which would be a nuisance if it
were in a public street or common, where all persons had a legal
right to be without question as to their purpose or business.
It will be unnecessary to pass in review all the cases which in
England and this country establish the principle, or to examine
and reconcile if possible those which seem to conflict with it. It
is put in many of them on the grounds of contributory negligence
in the trespasser. It is plain, however, that the two principles
are- entirely independent of each other, though they do in fact
often concur, and thereby have made confusion. In Hounsell v.
Smith, 7 0. B. N. S. 731, the plaintiff fell down a quarry, which
was left open and upguarded on the unenclosed waste lands of the
defendant, over which, in passing from one public highway to another, the public were freely allowed to walk: it was held that the
defendant, the owner, was under no legal obligation to fence the
excavation, unless it was made so near to a public road or way as
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to constitute a public nuisance, or, in other words, to render the
lawful use of such public road dangerous. "No right is alleged,"
says Mr. Justice WILLIAMS, "it is merely stated that the owners
allowed all persons who chose to do so, for recreation or for business, to go upon the waste without complaint; that they were not
churlish enough to interfere with any person who went there. He
must take the permission with its concomitant conditions, and it
may be, perils." This decision was cited with approbation and
affirmed in Binks v. The South Yorkshire Railway and River
Dun Co., 3 Best & Sm. 244. But a much stronger case, and
more directly. in point, is Lygo v. Newbold, 9 Exch. 302. It was
there decided that even an express permission given to the plaintiff by the defendant's servant to occupy a place to which she
had no right would not cast responsibility on the master. The
plaintiff in that case, without the defendant's authority, but by
the permission of his servant, rode in a cart along with some
gQods which the defendant had contracted to carry for her. The
cart, being insufficient, broke down, and the plaintiff was injured.
It was held that she could not recover.
Thus the three superior courts of England, the Common Pleas,
Queen's Bench and Exchequer, concur in this doctrine.
But our own case of Knight v. Abert, 6 Barr 472, is on all
fours with them. It was there decided that though no action
lies in Pennsylvania for trespass by cattle pasturing on unenclosed woodland, yet, that not being a matter of right, the owner
of land is not liable for an injury sustained by such cattle falling
into a hole dug by him within the bounds of his land and left unenclosed. "He who suffers his cattle to go at large," says C. J.
GIBSON, "takes upon himself the risks incident to it." So must
a person, using by permission or sufferance the private property
of another, take upon himself the risks incident to it. To the
same effect, if closely examined, is The Philadelphiaand Readig
Railroad Company v. Hfummel, 8 Wright 878. 'The plaintiff
below in that case was a boy of tender years, to whom no contributory negligence could be imputed. He was on the track of
a railroad, not at a crossing. It was held that the railroad company, as to persons so on the track, were not bound to give any
warning at starting. "Blowing the whistle of the locomotive, or
making any other signal," said 'Mr. Justice STROXCG, "was not a
duty owed to the persons in the neighborhood, and consequently
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the fact that the whistle was not blown, nor signal made, was no
evidence of negligence." And, again: "There is as perfect a
duty to guard against an accidental injury to a night intruder
into one's bed-chamber as there is to look out for trespassers upon
a railroad where the public has no right to be." No reference is
made in the opinion to Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29, a decision
much controverted, but one which has stood its ground. But in
that case the careless act of the defendant, in leaving a horse and
cart standing in a public street without anybody to watch it,
amounted to a nuisance, and it is to be distinguished on that
ground. Had it been left standing on an open, unenclosed lot,
the ruling in all probability would have been different. Yet a
doubt has been more than once expressed, whether when a child
receives an injury from indu]ging in what is called "the natural
instinct of a child," by getting up behind a gentleman's carriage
whilst it is in motion, or standing in charge of a coachman, though
without a servant on the footboard, the. principle of Lynch v. Nizrdin would apply: Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113; Lygo v.
NPewbold, 9 Exch. 302. It would matter not, so far as his master
was concerned, whether the coachman allowed it or not.
The application of this principle to the determination of the
case in hand is not difficult. The plaintiff may not have been
technically a trespasser. The platform was open; there was a
general license to pass over it. But he was where he had no
legal right to be. His presence there was in no way connected
with the purposes for which the platform was constructed. Had
it been the hour for the arrival or departure of a train, and be
had gone there to welcome a coming or speed a parting guest, it
might very well be contended ihat he was there by the authority
of defendants, as much as if he was actually a passenger, and it
would then matter not how unusual might have been the crowd,
the defendants would have been responsible. As to all such persons to whom they stood in such a relation as required care on
their part, they were bound to have the struoture strong enough
to bear all who could stand on it. As to all others they were
liable only for wanton or intentional injury. The plaintiff was on
the spot merely to enjoy himself, to gratify his curiosity or to
give vent to his patriotic feelings. The defendants had nothing
to do with that. They were conveying the President of the
United States and his party on a special excursion train. They
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must have stopping-places. They were certainly under no obligation to keep them secret. On the occasion in question it seems
that they. meant to do so in order to prevent detention and confusion. As we have seen, they cannot be made liable by the
unauthorized act of one of their employees, through whom it
leaked out what the hour was the train was expected to arrive at
Johnstown, nor for that of another in backing up the train so as
to give the people who had assembled an opportunity of seeing
and hearing the President. I am bound to have the approach to
my house sufficient for all visitors on business or otherwise; but
if a crowd gathers upon it to witness a passing, parade and it
breaks down, though it may be shown not to have been sufficient
even for its ordinary use, I am not liatle to one of the crowd,-I
owe no duty to him. If a traveller by foot, on the open track of
a railroad, crosses a bridge, which ought to be, but is not in its
ordinary use, strong enough to bear a locomotive and train of cars,
and a rotten board breaks down under him, the company are not
liable to him, for they owe him no duty. However much to be
lamented was the sad occurrence which occasioned this suit, and
however much sympathy may be felt for those who were injured,
and the families of those who lost their lives, we are of the opinion that the circumstances of the case were not such as to cast
any pecuniary responsibility on the railroad company, and that
the learned judge below was therefore right in directing the jury
to find a verdict for the defendants.
Judgment affirmed.
The foregoing case is one which excited great interest, not only in the
locality, but throughout the profession
in the state, having been regarded as a
test case upon which would depend the
fate of more than two hundred actions
of the same kind, brought against the
railroad company by parties injured by
the unfortunate accident at Johnstown,
in September 1866.
The full list of authorities cited, renders it unnecessary for us to do more
than add a brief note of two English
cases reported since tie argument.
In Gautret, Administrator,v. Egerton,
Law Rep. 2 C. P. 371, the declaration
VoL. XVII.-47

stated that the defendants were possessed
of land with a canal and cuttings intersecting the same, and of bridges across
the canal and cuttings communicating
with and leading to certain docks of the
defendants, which laud and bridges were
used with the consent and permission of
the defendants, by persons proceeding
to and coming from the docks; that they
wrongfully and improperly kept and
maintained the land, canal, cuttings,
and bridges, and suffered them to be in
so improper a state and condition as to
render them unsafe for persons lawfully
passing along and over the said land and
bridges towards the said docks; and
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being occupied. With tilepermission
of the station-master, lie went to his
negligent, and improper conduct of the wagon, which was shunted in tile usual
defendants, fell into one of the cuttings place, took some coal from the top of
the wagon, and descended on to the
antt was drowned.
Defendants demurred, on the ground flagged path. .The flag he stepped on
that the declaration stated no actionable gave way, and he fell into one of the
breach of duty by defendants, and the cellsand was injured. It was held that,
demurrer was sustained, WILLES, J.,
although not getting his coal in the
saying : "The consequences of these usual mode, the plaintiffwas not a mere
accidents are sought to be visited upon licensee, but was engaged with the conthese defendants, because they have al- sent and invitation of the defendants, in
lowed persons to go over their land, not a transaction of common interest to
alleging it to have been upon the busi- both parties, and was, therefore, entitled
ness or for tile
benefit of the defendants, to require that the defendants' premises
or as the servants or agents of the de- should be in a reasonably secure condifendants ; nor alleging that the defend- tion. BRAMwELL, B., said: "I have
ants have been guilty of any wrongful had considerable doubts, and am not
act, such as digging a trench on the wholly free from them. If the plaintiff
land, or misrepresenting its condition, bad. gone where he did by the mere
or anything equivalent to laying a trap license of the defendants, he would have
for the unwary passengers; but simply gone there subject to all the risks atbecause they permitted these persons to tending his going; as for instance, if/he
use a way with the condition of which, went there to see something that was going
for anything that appears, those who on in a neighboringfield. If, therefore,
suffered the injury were perfectly well this had been the first occasion of such
acquainted. That is the whole sum and an errand, he would have had no claim.
substance of these declarations. * * * But many people had been in the habit
Every man is bound not wilfully to de- of going to unload their wagons by tipceive others, or do any act that may ping, and it became a practice, so that
place them in danger; * * * but I can- consignees might consider it as part of
not conceive that he could incur any their contract to go and assist in that
responsibility merely by reason of his operation.
I have had great doubt
allowing the way to be out of repair."
whether all such persons were not mere
The same question was considered in licensees, and I have that doubt still ;
the very recent case (May 1869) of
for the defendants might at any time
Holmes v.
E. Railway Co., Law Rep. say to them, "you have no right to go
4 Exch.254. At the defendants' station there," and prevent them from doing so.
at 0. it was the habit to unload coal- Still, I think they come within the dewagons by shunting them and tipping scription of persons invited to go there,
the coal into cells ; it was also the prac- in the same *sense in which the public
tice for the consignees of the coal, or their are invited to walk into a shop. They
servants, to assist in the uloading, and are persons who are, in effect, told that
for that purpose to go along a flagged they may safely do that which it is for
path by the side of the wagons. The the convenience of both parties to hare
plaintiff was consignee of a coal-wagon, done."
which could not be unloaded in the
See also Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B.
usual way, on account of all the cells (109 E. 0. L. B.) 221.
J. T. M.

that one G. lawfully passing over and

u4ng the bridges, through the wrongful,
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Supreme Court of the United States.
THORINGTON v. SMITH & HARTLEY.
The Confederate States, though not a defacto government in the highest sense
of that term, were a government of paramount force having actual supremacy
within certain territorial limits, and therefore adefactogovernment in such a sense
as made civil obedience to their authority the duty of the inhabitants of the territory under their control.
Confederate notes as contracts in themselves are nullities, but they must be regarded as a currency imposed on the citizens of the insurrectionary states by irresistible force, and therefore contracts for payment in such currency, made between
citizens of the Confederacy in the ordinary course of civil business and without
dir~et intent to assist the insurrection are valid, and will be enforced by the courts
of the United States.
A contract to pay dollars made between citizens of any state maintaining its
constitutional relations with the National Government, is a contract to pay lawful
money of the United States, and cannot be modified or explained by parol evidence.
But the word dollars if used in a contract between citizens of a foreign state
could be shown by parol evidence to mean dollars of a different kind from United
States dollars, and the same rule must apply to a contract between citizens of the
Confederate -States.
A party entitled to be paid in Confederate notes, can only recover their actual
value at the time and place of the contract in lawful money of the United States.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the
Middle District of Alabama.
This was a bill in equity for the enforcement of a vendor's lien.
Smith & Hartley purchased from Thorington a piece of land,
and executed to him their promissory note for part of the purchase-money.

"But it was insisted by way of defence that the negotiation for the
purchase of the land took place, and that the note in controversy,
payable one day after date, was made at Montgomery, in the state
of Alabama, where all the parties resided in November 1864, at
which time the authority of the United States was excluded from'
that portion of the state, and the only currency in use consisted

of Confederate treasury notes, issued and put in circulation by
the persons exercising the ruling powers of the states in rebellion,
known as the Confederate government.

It was also insisted that the land purchased was worth no more
than $3000 in lawful money; that the contract price was $45,000;
that this price, by the agreement of the parties, was to be paid in
Confederate notes; that $35,000 were actually paid in these

THORINGTON v. SMITH.

notes, and that the note given for the remaining $10,000 was to
be discharged in the same manner, and it was claimed on this
state of facts that the vendor was not entitled- to relief in a
court of the United States.
This view was sustained in the court below, and the bill was
dismissed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CHASE, C. J.-The questiops before us upon appeal are these:1. Can a contract for the payment of Confederate notes, made
during the late rebellion, between parties residing within the socalled Confederate States, be enforced at all in the courts of the
United States?
2. Can evidence be received to prove that a promise expressed
to be for the payment of dollars was in fact for the payment of
any other than lawful dollars of the United States ?
3. Does the evidence on the record establish the fact that the
note for $10,000 was to be paid, by agreement of the parties, in
Confederate notes ?
The first question is by no means free from difficulty.
It cannot be questioned that the Confederate notes were issued
in furtherance of an unlawful attempt to overthrow the government of the United States by insurrectionary force. Nor is it a
doubtful principle of law that no contracts made in aid of such
an attempt can be enforced through the courts of the country
whose government is thus assailed.
But was the contract of the parties to this suit a contract of
that character ? Can it be fairly described as a contract in aid
of the rebellion?
In examining this question the state of that part of the country
in which it was made must be considered.
It is familiar history that early in 1861 the authorities of seven
states, supported, as was alleged, by popular majorities, combined
f6r the overthrow of the National Union, and for the establishment within its boundaries of a separate and independent confederation.
A governmental organization representing these
states was established at Montgomery, in Alabama, first under a
provisional constitution, and afterwards under a constitution
intended to be permanent.
In the course of a few months four other states acceded to this
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confederation, and the seat of the central authority was transferred to Richmond, in Virginia.
It was by the central authority thus organized, and under its
direction, that the civil war was carried on upon a vast scale
against the government of the United States for more than four
years. Its power was recognised as supreme in nearly the whole
of the territory of the states confederated. It was the actual
government of all the insurgent states, except those portions of
them protected from its control by the presence of the armed
forces of the national government.
What was the precise character of this government in contemplation of law? It is difficult to define it with exactness. Any
definition that may be given may not improbably be found to require limitation and qualification. But the general principles of
law relating to de facto governments will, we think, conduct us to
a conclusion sufficiently accurate.
There are several degrees of what is called de facto government. Such a government, in its highest degree, assumes a character very closely resembling that of a lawful government. This
is when the usurping government expels the regular authorities
from their customary seats and functions, and establishes itself in
their place, and so becomes the actual government of a country.
The distinguishing characteristic of such a government is that
the adherents to it in war against the government de jure do not
incur the penalties of treason, and, under certain limitations,
obligations assumed by it 'in behalf of the country, or otherwise,
will -in general be respected by the government de jure when
restored.
Examples of this description of government de facto are found
in English history. The statute 11 Henry VII., c. 1 (Brit. Stat.
at Large), releases from penalties for treason all persons who, in
defence of the king for the time being, wage war against those
who endeavor to subvert his authority by force of arms, though
warranted in so doing by the lawful monarch: 4 B. Com. 77.
But this is where the usurper obtains actual possession of the
royal authority of the kingdom; not where he has succeeded only
in establishing his power over particular localities. Being in such
possession, allegiance is due to him as king de facto.
Another example may be found in the government of England
under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament, and afterwards by
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Cromwell as Protector. It was not, in the contemplation of law,
a government de jure, but it was a government cde facto in the most
absolute sense. It made laws, treaties, and conquests which
reniained the laws, treaties, and conquests of England after the
restoration. The better opinion is, that acts done in obedience to
this government could not be justly regarded as treasonable,
though in hostility to the king de jure. Such acts were protected
from criminal prosecution by the spirit, if not the letter, of the
statute of Henry VIL It was held otherwise by the judges by
whom Sir Henry Vane was tried for treason (6 State Trials 119),
in the year following the restoration. But such a judgment, in
such a time, has little authority.
It is very certain that the Confederate government was never
acknowledged by the United States as a de facto government in
this sense. Nor was it acknowledged as such by other powers.
No treaties were made by it. No obligations of a national character were created by it binding, after its dissolution, on the states
which it represented, or on the national government. From a
very early period of the civil war to its close it was regarded as
simply the military representative of the insurrection against the
authority of the United States.
But there is another description of government called also by
publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be
more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its
distinguishing characteristics are: First, that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against
the rightful authority of an established and lawful government;
and second, that while it exists, it must necessarily be obeyed in
civil matters by private citizens, who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible as
wrongdoers for these acts, though not warranted by the laws of
the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort' are
established over districts differing greatly-in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered also by civil authority,
supported more or less directly by military force.
One example of this sort of government is found in the case
of Castine, in Maine, reduced to British possession during the war
of 1812. From the 1st of September 1814 to the ratification of
the treaty of peace in 1815, according to the judgment of the
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court in United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 253, "the British
government exercised all civil and military authority over the
place." * * "The authority of the United oStates over the territory was suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enfoi'eed there, or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conqueror. By
the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temiiporary allegiance
to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such
only, as it chose to recognise and impose."
It is not to be inferred from this that the obligations of the
people of Castine, as citizens of the United States, were abrogated. They were suspended merely by the presence, and only
during the presence of the paramount force.
A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied
during the war with Mexico by the troops of the United States. It
was determined by this court in Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 614,
that although Tampico did not become a part of the United States
in consequence of that occupation, still, having come together with
the whole state of Tamaulipas, of which it was part, into the exclusive possession of the national forces, it must be regarded and
respected by other nations as the territory of the United States.
There were cases of temporary possession of territory by lawful and regular governments at war with the country of which
the territory so possessed was part.
The central government established for the insurgent states
differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico,
in the circumstance that its authority did not originate lawful
acts of regular war; but it was not on that account less actual or
less supreme, and we think that it must be classed among the
governments of which these are examples. It is to be observed
that the rights and obligations of a belligerent were conceded to
it in its. military character, very soon after the wvar began, from
motives of humanity and expediency, by the United States.
The whole territory controlled by it was thereafter held to be
enemy's territory, and the inhabitants of that territory were held
in most respects for enemies. To the extent then of actual
supremacy, however unlawfully gained, in all matters of government within its military lines, the power of the insurgent governmea-t cannot be questioned.
That supremacy would not justify acts of hostility to the
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United States.

How far it should excuse tnem must be left to

the lawful government upon the re-establishment of its authority.
But it made civil obedience to its authority not only a necessity
but a duty. Without such obedience civil order was impossible.
It was by this government exercising its power through an
immense territory that the Confederate notes were issued early
in the war; and these notes in a short time became almost exclusively the currency of the insurgent states.
As contracts in themselves, in the contingency of successful
revolution, these notes were nullities; for except in that event
there could be no payer. They bore indeed this character upon
their face, for they were made payable only "after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the
United States of America."
While the war lasted, however, they had a certain contingent
value, and were used as money in nearly all the business transactions of many millions of people. They must be regarded, therefore, as a currency imposed on the community by irresistible
force.
It seems to follow as a necessary consequence from the actual
supremacy of the insurgent government, as a belligerent, within
the territory where it circulated, and the necessity of civil obe.ience on the part of all who remained in it, that this currency
must be regarded in courts of law in the same light as if it had
been issued by a foreign government, temporarily occupying a
part of the territory of the United States.
Contracts stipulating for payments in that currency cannot be
regarded as made in aid of the"foreign invasion in the one case,
or of the domestic insurrection in the other. They have no
necessary relation to the hostile government, whether invading,.
or insurgent. They are transactions in the ordinary course of
civil society, and, though they may indirectly and remotely promote the ends of the unlawful government, are without blame,
except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent
to further the invasion or insurrection.
We cannot doubt that such contracts should be enforced in the'
courts of thd United States, after the restoration of.peace, to the
extent of their just obligation.
The first question, therefore, must receive an affirmative
answer.
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The second question, whether evidence can be received to prove
that a promise made in one of the insurgent states, and expressed
to be for the payment of dollars, without qualifying words, was,
in fact, made for the payment of any other than lawful dollars of
the 7-7nited States, is next to be considered.
"squite clear that a contract to pay dollars, made between
citizens of any state of the Union maintaining its constitutional
relat-i:ns with the national government, is a contract to pay lawful
motey of the United States, and cannot be modified or explained
c- parol evidence.
But it is equally clear if in any other country coins or notes
denominated dollars should be authorized of different value from
the coins or notes which are current here under that name, that
in a suit upon a contract to pay dollars, made in that country,
evidence'would be admitted to prove what kind of dollars were
intended, and if it should turn out that foreign dollars were
meant, to prove their equivalent value in lawful money of the
United States.
Such evidence does not modify or alter the contract. It simply
explains an ambiguity which, under the general rules of evidence,
may be removed by parol evidence.
We have already seen that the people of the insurgent states,
under the Confederate government, were in legal contemplation
substantially in the same condition as inhabitants of districts of a
country occupied and controlled by an invading belligerent. The
rules which would apply in the former case would apply in the
latter; and, as in the former case, the people must be regarded
as subjects of a foreign power, and contracts among them be interpreted and enforced with reference to the laws imposed by the
conqueror, so in the latter case the inhabitants must be regarded
as under the authority of the insurgent belligerent power actually
established as the government of the country,; and contracts
made with them must be interpreted aud inferred with reference
to the condition of things created by the acts of the governing
power.
It is said, indeed, that under the insurgent government the
word "dollar" had the same meaning as under the government
of the United States; that the Confederate notes were never
made a legal tender; and, therefore, that no evidence can be
received to show any other meaning of the word when used in a
contract.
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But it must be remembered that the whole condition of things
in the insurgent states was matter of fact rather than matter of
law; and, as matter of fact, these notes, payable at a future and
contingent day, which has not arrived and can never arrive, were
forced into circulation as dollars, if not directly by the legislation, yet indirectly and quite as effectually by the acts of the
insurgent government. Considered in themselves, and in the
light of subsequent events, these notes had no real value, but they
were made current as dollars by irresistible force. They were
the only measure of value which the people had, and their use
was almost a matter of absolute necessity. And this gave them
a sort of value, insignificant and precarious enough, it is true,
but always having a sufficiently definite relation to gold and
silver, the universal measures of value, so that it was always easy
to ascertain how much gold and silver was the real equivalent of
a sum expressed in this currency.
In the light of these facts it seems hardly less than absurd to
say that these dollars must be regarded as identical in kind and
value with the dollars which constitute the money of the United
States. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that they were essentially different in both respects, and it seems to us that no rule of
evidence, properly understood, requires us to refuse, under the
circumstances, to admit proof of the sense in which the word
dollar was actually used in the contract before us.
Our answer to the second question is, therefore, also in the
affirmative. We are clearly of opinion that such evidence must
be received in respect to such contracts in order that justice may
be done between the parties, and that the party entitled to be
paid in these Confederate dollars can only receive their actual
value at the time and place of the contract in lawful money of the
United States.
We do not think it necessary to go into a detailed examination
of the evidence in the record in order to vindicate our answer to
the third question. It is enough to say that it has left no doubt
ia our minds that the note for $10,000, to enforce payment of
which suit was brought in the Circuit Court, was to be paid, by
agreement of the parties, in Confederate notes.
It follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court must be
reversed, and the cause remanded for a new ti'ial, in conformity

with this opinion.

IN RE BELLIS.

United States District Court-Southern -Districtof New York.
Ix as GARRET S. BELLIS AND JAMES MILLIGAN.
A witness who was a lawyer being under examination was questioned touching
a certain conveyance made to him by the bankrupt and wife and a subsequent conveyance by him to the wife, and refused to testify thereon as matter within the
privilege of confidential communications between attorney and client.
Held, on the facts stated the questions were proper and must be answered, and
are not within such privilege.

Ox April 8th 1868, James Milligan and wife executed a deed
conveying certain property to
conveyed the
On April 10th 1868, the said
same property to Elizabeth R. Milligan, wife of said James Milligan.
is an attorney; being called as a witness in the
matter of Bellis and Milligan, bankrupts, he refused to testify
concerning the said transfers on the ground that they were made
in the course of his professional business, and are therefore within
the privilege of confidential communications between him and his
clients.
The following questions were asked, all of which the witness
refused to answer :Q. 1. State whether James Milligan, one of the bankrupts,
conveyed to you by deed, on or about the 8th day of April 1868,
certain real estate situated in the city of Brooklyn.
Q. 2. State the consideration, if any, given by you to him
therefor.
Q. 3. State whether you simultaneously, on or about the same
date, by deed, *conveyed to Elizabeth R. Milligan, wife of said
James Milligan, the same premises so conveyed to you by James
Milligan on or about the 8th day of April 1868.
Q. 4. State the consideration, if any, given to you by Elizabeth R. Milligan therefor.
Q. 5. State whether at that time any suit or action at law was
pending in relation to the said real estate between the said James
Milligan and wife and any person, in which you were attorney or
counsel of Mr. and Mrs. Milligan, or whether there has, since
the 8th day of April 1868, been such an action pending in relation to said real estate in which you were attorney or counsel.
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JOHN FITcir, Register.-In this case the witness claims that
the rule which protects professional communications of clients to
their attorney or counsel, extends to all business communications
as well as those appertaining to suits in law or equity or other
judicial proceedings.. Upon examining the authorities, I find that
in the early history of litigation parties prosecuted or defended
their suits in person. In the progress of time, as litigation
increased, and judicial proceedings became settled and established, men skilled and learned in the law and practice of the
courts were employed to conduct the prosecution and defence of
causes. Parties were not then compelled to testify, and hesitated
to communicate the facts in relation to their causes to others; to
obviate that difficulty the courts adopted the rule in relation to
professional communications of clients to their attorneys, exempting the same from disclosure, &c. Among the early cases upon
this subject is that of Avnesly v. The -Earlof Anglesea, before
the Barons of the Irish Exchequer: 17 Howell's State Trials
1139. The case was most extensively and ably argued, and very
elaborately considered by the court, and the conclusion arrived at
as to the true origin of the rule in question may be best stated in
the language of Mr. Baron MOUNTENAY, who says, at page 1240,
"Mr. Recorder has very properly mentioned the foundation upon
which it hath been held, and it is certainly undoubted law that
attorneys ought to keep inviolably the secrets .of their clients,
viz.: That an increase of legal business and the inability of parties to transact that business themselves, made it necessary for
them to employ other persons who might transact that business
for them. That this necessity introduced with it the necessity of
what the law hath very justly established, an inviolable secrecy
to be observed by attorneys, in order to render if safe for clients
to communicate to their attorneys all proper instructions for the
carrying on of these causes which they found themselves .under
the necessity of intrusting to their care."
In the case of -Dixonv. Parmelee, 2 Vt. lep. 185, PADDOCK,
J., says: "It also became necessary for courts to adopt a rule by
way of pledge to suitors that their secret and confidential communications to their attorneys should not be drawn from them
with or without the consent of such attorney." Among the
earliest cases to be found on this subject are 'Berd v. Lovelaee,
Cary's Rep. 88; Austin v. TVesey, Id. 89; Milway v. Kilway, Id.
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126 ; -Dennisv. Codrington, Id. 143. Solicitors and counsel were
excused from testifying on the ground that they were solicitors or
counsel in the cause. In Waldron v. Ward, Styles' Rep. 449, a
witness was offered in evidence to be examined as to some matter
"whereof he had been made privy as of counsel in the cause."
The courts would not permit the examination. In Syarke v. Middleton, Keble 505, counsel for the defendant was excused from
testifying on the ground "that he should only reveal such things
as he either knew before he was of counsel, or that came to his
knowledge since by other persons." In Cuts v. Pickering, 1
Ventr. 197, a witness was called to testify concerning an erasure
in a will supposed to have been made by Pickering. The witness,
after the erasure, was retained as his solicitor in the cause. In
V'aliant v. -Dodermead,2 Atk. 524, witness was called to prove
certain interrogatories. Objections, that his knowledge of the matters was obtained as a clerk in court. Evidence received. Lord
IHADWICKE says: "That the matters inquired after by the plaintiff 's interrogatories were antecedent transactions to the commencement of the suit." In the last-cited cases the communications to the respective parties were during the pendency of
an action in which they were either attorney, solicitor, or counsel.
The same rule is held by the courts in this state, and seems to
decide the question in this case. In 17 Johns. 835, the court
says: "The privilege, in its most comprehensive sense, is not
broad enough to cover collateral facts, the answer to which does
not betray any confidential communication between attorney and
client."
An attorney or counsel may be called on to testify to a collateral fact within his knowledge, or to a fact which he might know
without being intrusted with it by his client: Johnson v. Daverne,
19 Johns. 134; 0obdem v. Kendrick, 4 Term 431.
Communications made to an attorney at law with a view to
obtain his assistance in the commission of a felony are not privileged: The Rochester City Bank v. Suydam, 5 How. 254. To
be brought within its protection if they do not appertain to any
suit or legal proceeding commenced or contemplated, should be
made under cover of an employment strictly professional, and
should be such as the business to be done requires to be made.
They should also be of a confidential nature, and so considered
at the time, and should be shown to have been made with direct
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reference to the professional business upon which they may be
supposed to bear: 17 Howell's State Trials 1139; 1 Greenlf.
Ev. 244; 1 Phil. Ev. 145; 1 Starkie.
In section 26 of the Bankrupt Act 1867, it is provided that
the court may at all times require the bankrupt, upon reasonable
notice, to attend and submit to an examination on oath upon all
matters relating to the disposal or condition of his property; the
bankrupt is therefore liable to be called (and in this case has been
called) and examined upon these very transactions. He cannot
extend an immunity to his attorney which he does not possess
himself. The privilege is for the benefit of the client, not the
attorney. The authorities upon this point which I have cited
show that originally no communications were protected as confidential professional communications, except that which related to
the management of some suit or judicial proceeding actually
pending or about to be commenced in some court. Few cases
have gone beyond that. In the case of Wilson v. Troup, 7
Johns. 0. Rep. 25, and s. c. 2 Cowen Rep. 195, Haight, an attorney, was retained to conduct the foreclosure of a mortgage by
advertisement under the act concerning the foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement. It was claimed'that Troup employed
Haight because Haight was a lawyer, and the Court of Errors
evidently considered the relation of the party in the statutory
foreclosure case, namely, Troup and Haight, as that of attorney
and client, and therefore the evidence of Haight was not admissible as against Troup, his client. This decision is unquestionably
correct and founded upon the principle that a statutory foreclosure
of a mortgage by advertisement is in the nature of a judicial proceeding. And in Jackson v. Dominick, 14 Johns. Rep. 443, the
court says, "that a foreclosure under the statute is substantially
equivalent to a foreclosure in equity, same in effect :" 5 How. Pr.
Rep. 261.
. In this case there was no action pending. . The witness drew a
deed conveying certain real estate from James Milligan to himself. He then conveyed the said real estate to Mrs. Milligan, the
wife of said James Milligan. There was no action then pending
in regard to said real estate, and the question before the court in
relation to said real estate now is, whether the legal title of the
real estate so conveyed vests in Mrs. Milligan as against the.
assignee in bankruptcy. Now, the witness is simply called upon

IN RE BELLIS.

to state the fact of the receiving and the conveying of the real
estate, the consideration, if any, he gave or received therefor,
and what was said and done on the occasion. His testimony, if
given, cannot do injustice to any one. The same facts have been
proven by James Milligan in these proceedings. The deeds can
be given in evidence, and although Mlrs. Milligan cannot be compelled to testify to these facts in bankruptcy, still she can be
made to do so by a bill in equity on the part of the assignee
against herself, her husband and the witness to set aside said
conveyance as fraudulent, &c., &c., as against the assignee in
bankruptcy: 80 Barb. 506. The Court of Appeals in Whiting
v.- Barney, 80 N. Y. 880, SELDENv, J., holds that the rule which
protects professional communications of clients to their attorneys
or counsel from disclosure should only extend to such communications as have relation to some suit or other judicial proceeding
either existing or contemplated.
The testimony in this case is claimed only for the bankrupt,
which brings it within the cases of Griffith v. _Davs, 5 Barn. &
Ald. 502; Shore v. Bedford, 5 Mlan. & G. 271; Wreeks v. Argent,
16 Al. & W. 816. In 80 N. Y. 842, INGRAUAM, J., says, "If he
was only the counsel of Barney, then the decisions settle that
the disclosures being made in the presence of a third party, they
are not privileged." I think that for the purposes of this case
Mrs. Milligan, the wife of the petitioner, who received the conveyance from the witness as property to her sole and separate
use, must be considered as a third person. I have given the authorities as they were previous to the legislative enactments in
this state in relation to the examination of parties as witnesses,
which enactments are as follows: Any party in any civil suit or
proceeding, either in law or equity, had before any court or officers, may require any adverse party, whether complainant, plaintiff, petitioner or defendant, or any one of said adverse party, any
and every person who is beneficially interested in said suit or proceedings, though not nominally as parties, to give testimony under
oath in such suit or proceeding; and such adverse party may be
examined orally, or under a commission, in the same manner as
persons not parties to such suit or proceeding, and who are com
petent witnesses therein; and such party may be subpoenaed and
his attendance as a witness compelled, or he may be examined by
a commission, or conditionally, or his testimony perpetuated in
the same manner as any competent witness.
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" The court or officer before whom such suit or proceeding may
be had, shall have power to dismiss the bill, petition, or proceeding of any party, or any part thereof, with costs, or nonsuit any
party, or strike out or disregard any defence or any part thereof
of any party who shall refuse to testify.
"Any party in any suit or proceeding as aforesaid shall be
required, to entitle him to examine the adverse party as a witness
in any suit or proceeding, to give testimony therein in the same
manner as the attendance of.witnesses in ordinary cases."
The Act of Congress, July 16th 1862, provides:"That the laws of the state in which the court shall be held,
shall be the rules

*

*

*

as to the competency of witnesses

in the court of the United States."
In this case the rights and privileges of the attorney and his
duty to his clients, are entirely separate and distinguished from
his rights and duties as purchaser and vendor. The transaction
in relation to the purchase and sale of the real estate was not a
part and parcel of, or in and about any lawsuit in which he was
counsel for either the petitioner or his wife. It therefore stands
as a transaction of purchase and sale of real estate, the witness
purchasing the real estate of Mr. Milligan, and selling the same
to Mrs. Milligan, his wife, two days thereafter.
It is claimed by the assignee in bankruptcy that this was a
mere fraud and cover, that it was a. mere formal transfer of the
real estate from the husband to the wife, using the name of the
witness as a mere go-between, .8o that the conveyance might
technically conform to the letter of the Act of 1849 regulating
the property-rights of married women, and at the same time
defeat the spirit and intent of the law; that the wife acquired
no legal or vested rights therein by said conveyance other than
her contingent right of dower to which she was previously
entitled.
I find that previous to the Act of 1847, and the acts
affiendatory thereunto, an attorney occupied! the same position
as his client in relation to giving testimony, and was privileged
as to all matters which -his client could not be compelled to disclose. But now, whenever and wherever the client can be compelled as a witness to testify to any fact, then the attorney must
also testify;. the statutes of this state having abrogated the
former common-law rule to that effect.

